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Abstract: Ostrom’s design principles have been broadly used to analyse the governance of common
pool resources. However, they are normally assessed as present or absent. We challenge this
assumption by considering them as fuzzy sets where membership scores range from 0 to 1, because,
in real situations, the design principles can be present at a certain level. We define categories to
assess the level of membership and apply it to a single case study analysing how changes in water
policy can affect the community-based management of the Water User Association of Mondomo
(Colombia). In rural areas of Colombia, most water and sanitation services are provided by water
user associations, wherein civil society has developed governance systems based on active citizen
involvement and community-based management. Some of these associations have been operating for
decades and are essential pillars of the local social fabric. However, recent changes in the country’s
policy and legal framework threaten these long-lasting governance systems. The results show
that most of the design principles would suffer important changes that undermine the governance
system. Essential principles for sustainable community-based governance, such as the congruence
of the rules with local conditions, the local monitoring and sanctioning capacities, the internal
conflict-resolution mechanisms and the recognition of the rights to organize, are dramatically reduced
after the policy implementation.
Keywords: democratic water governance; Latin America; Ostrom design principles; water
user associations
1. Introduction
Water is at the core of sustainable development, as recognised by Sustainable Development
Goal 6 [1]. Water resources, and the range of services they provide, underpin poverty reduction,
economic growth and environmental sustainability. However, in 2015, an estimated 663 million
people were still using unimproved water sources or surface water, and eight out of 10 people who
lack improved drinking water sources live in rural areas [2]. Although water policies regulate the
provision, rights of access and use, and distribution and disposal of water resources, developing
country governments often lack the means to effectively provide water and sanitation, especially in
rural areas. This situation has forced citizens to develop alternative governance systems to secure their
access to water [3].
Governance has been defined as a way of collectively managing social relations to define or
allocate possible resources [4,5] between public or private actors to obtain mutual gains while also
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managing possible conflicts [6]. The governance of natural resources can be understood as the
broader system of formal and informal institutions in which management actions are embedded and
that provide the essential direction, resources, and structures needed to meet overarching resource
management goals [7,8]. It can also be explained as the interactions—among structures, processes
and traditions—that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken
and how citizens and other stakeholders have their say in the management of natural resources [9].
Management is often considered to be the operationalization of governance processes that support
decision making and develop direct actions on the ground [10]. Governance processes usually involve
a large number of key players with different skills, values, and preferences; these players represent
different interests in the management of natural resources [11,12]. Constraints on local communities,
such as poverty, low educational levels and inefficient political participation, hinder their effective
involvement in the governance and co-management of natural resources [13]. These asymmetries
of power mean that the poor and marginalized often lose when confronted by more influential
actors [14,15]. The well-known Ostrom’s design principles (DPs) [16] were proposed to analyse the
governance of common pool resources (CPR) as described below. CPR are natural or human-made
resources where one person’s use subtracts from another’s use and where it is often necessary, but
difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside the group from using the resource [17].
In many Latin America countries, both civil society and the private sector have organised
to facilitate water accessibility and sanitation in rural areas where governments do not provide
these services. Approximately 80,000 water user associations (WUAs) supply water to more than
40 million people and have the residual capacity to service another 18 million [18]. WUAs have
been defined as social structures created by groups of neighbours in suburban and rural areas which
are generally out of the range of the public, private or mixed capital companies that service major
cities. Using self-government statutes, teamwork and a simple, open and democratic leadership
election process, they focus their efforts on establishing a system for water capture, purification,
distribution and payment. Their management staff generally work pro-bono out of a sense of social
commitment [18].
Although Colombia ranks as one of the world’s leading countries in water resources supply, more
than 60% of Colombia’s rural population currently depends on WUAs to guarantee their access to
water for human consumption and small-scale production [19]. Actually, more than 12,000 WUAs,
known as acueductos comunitarios (community water pipelines), exist and supply water to more
than 8.5 million people, or 20% of the country’s population [20]. Andean rural communities have
high water supply levels, but almost 80% of them depend on WUAs to obtain access to water. A good
number of WUAs have been operating for over 30 years, indicating that they are not merely temporary
agents. Rather, they provide quality water to rural communities at affordable prices and in equitable
quantities [21].
WUAs operational method has been defined as “democratic water governance” and is grounded in
the principles of community-based management, fairness, responsible and active citizen involvement,
and agreements to safeguard sustainable and equitable access to water and sanitation services [18,22].
In fact, the role of these WUAs often transcends water service provision. They have come to foster rural
empowerment, the deepening of democracy, and active local participation in water policy-making,
despite the fact that they are very often neither recognized nor adequately coordinated by other water
policy-making entities [23,24]. Therefore, they are unevenly able to shape local affairs and defend
their interests.
This paper has a double objective: to introduce a methodological innovation by considering
Ostrom’s DPs as fuzzy sets where membership scores range from 0 to 1 [25]. Most analyses to date
have considered the DPs as crisp sets (e.g., 1 if the DP is present and 0 if is absent), without considering
that DPs can be present at a certain level. We based this assumption on the fact that DPs are imprecise
categories and, quite often, scoring them exclusively as present or absent implies homogenizing very
different real situations and excludes the possibility of introducing a degree of variation (membership)
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in how the DPs are expressed in each governance system. The second objective is to assess how
the external disturbances created by the new policy and regulations could challenge the governance
of Colombia’s traditional and long-standing water provision systems, using this methodological
innovation and applying to a reference case, the Mondomo’s WUA.
This WUA has more than 60 years of history and is considered a successful case of democratic
water governance in Colombia. It is also considered an example of robust collective action following
Ostrom’s approach [16]. To describe Mondomo’s WUA, we used the general variables included in
the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) proposed by Ostrom [26]. To analyse
how the new regulation may affect the robustness of the governance system of Mondomo’s WUA, we
assessed how the membership scores of the DPs change.
This study further contributes to the literature by: (1) considering the DPs as fuzzy sets and
not as dichotomous categories, as well as proposing a transparent and reliable protocol to establish
categories to assign membership scores that can be of high interest in the analysis of other common
pool resources (CPR) governance systems; (2) analysing the influence of the new Colombian legal
framework on the governance systems of traditional WUAs; and (3) using the DPs to analyse water
provision and distribution systems (there is an extensive literature using them to analyse irrigation
systems but not these water systems). By provision and distribution systems, we refer to the facilities
used to supply water from its source to the point of usage. Given the relevance of WUAs in Colombia,
this paper supports the advancement of knowledge.
1.1. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD)
Institutions are broadly defined as the prescriptions and procedures that humans use to organize
all forms of interactions [27]. The IAD framework was created and refined by Ostrom and her
colleagues [28,29] as a systematic and consistent method of analysing the deeper structures that
constitute specific action situations where human behaviour is central to understanding contextual
changes [26]. The framework is a conceptual map; it integrates different parts or sections that need to
be approached to understand how institutions change based on potential and real changes in context
(biophysical, economic, social, legal, etc.) (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. A framework for institutional analysis [26].
The focal unit of analysis is the “action arena”, which is the social space where participants
interact. It is compo d of an action situation and the participants in that situation. Action arena can
be consider d a set of dependent variables affected by three clusters of exogenous variables: (1) the
attributes of the biophysical or material conditions that are acted upon in these arenas; (2) the structure
and defining conditions of the community within which the action arena is placed; and (3) the rules
used by participants to regulate their relationships [29]. The IAD framework intends to explore the
different conditions that play a role in institutional change as well as the possible changes that different
institutional configurations might produce in the action arena and in the exogenous variables. Finally,
actors’ interactions with other actors and with the exogenous attributes produce different outcomes
that can be analysed by different evaluation criteria, thus producing outcomes that reinforce complex
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and changing behaviours [29]. Therefore, there is no single way to approach institutional change; such
change can be defined based on research objectives or based on the disciplines according to which one
is attempting to understand the conceptualization of actions [26].
1.2. Ostrom’s Design Principles as Fuzzy Sets
After extensive study of long-lasting CPR systems, Ostrom enumerated eight design principles
that characterized their governance systems. These principles enabled resource users to engage in
collective actions that led to sustainable management [16]. These DPs were present in long-lasting
systems but were absent in those that collapsed; thus, she proposed using the DPs to characterize
successful self-governance strategies. The DPs were defined as follows:
(1) Clearly defined boundaries: the boundaries of the resource system (e.g., irrigation system or
fishery) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly defined;
(2) Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs: the rules specifying the amount of resources
that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials,
and/or monetary inputs;
(3) Collective-choice arrangements: many of the individuals affected by harvesting and protection
rules are included in the group that can modify these rules;
(4) Monitoring: monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least
partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves;
(5) Graduated sanctions: users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions,
depending on the seriousness and context of the offense, from other users, from officials
accountable to these users, or from both;
(6) Conflict-resolution mechanisms: users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local
action arenas to resolve conflicts among users or between users and officials;
(7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize: the rights of users to devise their own institutions are
not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to
the resource;
(8) Nested enterprises: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. This last DP applies
to resources that are parts of larger systems.
Cox et al. [30] with the analysis of approximately 100 case studies, provided evidence that the
design principles hold up when challenged with data and suggested a revision of the DPs, splitting
DP1, DP2 and DP4 into two principles each, which led to 11 DPs (Table 1). We analysed this 11 DPs.
Table 1. Design principles.
DPs as Enunciated by Ostrom DPs as Enunciated by Cox et al.
1 Clearly defined boundaries
1A User boundaries
1B Resource boundaries
2 Equivalence between benefits
and costs
2A Congruence with local conditions
2B Appropriation and provision
3 Collective-choice arrangements 3 Collective-choice arrangements
4 Monitoring
4A Monitoring users
4B Monitoring the resource
5 Graduated sanctions 5 Graduated sanctions
6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms 6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7 Minimal recognition of rightsto organize 7
Minimal recognition of rights
to organize
8 Nested enterprises 8 Nested enterprises
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In this research, we consider the DPs as fuzzy sets, since we assume that they are not just present or
absent, but can have a gradation of presence. Fuzzy sets can help social scientists conceptualize social
and political phenomena as sets with imprecise boundaries between membership and non-membership.
Crisp sets perceive cases only as members or non-members of a set. The problem is that many core
concepts in social research are best understood as graded sets [31]. Fuzzy sets are not ordinal scales or
mere rankings of categories, but each degree represents a different empirical situation [25]. The basic
idea behind fuzzy sets is to permit the scaling of membership scores and thus allow partial or fuzzy
membership. A membership score of 1 indicates full membership in a set, scores close to 1 (e.g.,
0.8 or 0.9) indicate strong but not quite full membership in a set, scores less than 0.5 but greater than
0 (e.g., 0.2 and 0.3) indicate that objects are more “out” than “in” but still weak members of a set,
and a score of 0 indicates full non-membership in a set. Thus, fuzzy sets combine qualitative and
quantitative assessment: 1 and 0 are qualitative assignments (“fully in” and “fully out”, respectively);
values between 0 and 1 indicate partial membership. The 0.5 score is also qualitatively anchored, for it
indicates the point of maximum ambiguity (fuzziness) in the assessment of whether a case is more
“in” or “out” of a set [32]. Fuzzy sets require that researchers establish a very close correspondence
between fuzzy membership scores and the concepts they represent, as well as a careful calibration of
the fuzzy scores that reflect the degree of membership [25].
1.3. The New Water Regulatory Framework in Colombia
Colombia’s WUAs actually feel threatened by a regulation in process of implementation, proposed
in 2014 by the National Council of Economic and Social Policy [19] and partially ratified by national law
number 1898 [33]. This framework has as its core objective, the promotion of access to drinking water
and basic sanitation in Colombia’s rural areas by improving the general conditions of access to good
quality water for all rural inhabitants. Its objectives are: (1) strengthening the institutional capacity of
the state to intervene in rural areas; (2) promoting the structuring of sustainable schemes for drinking
water provision and sanitation in rural areas; (3) investing in infrastructures; and (4) promoting
effective practices of sanitary and environmental management. The regulation will be implemented
in two phases during 10 years, starting in 2014 with its presentation and discussion with WUA´s
national representatives.
At the local level, the regulation is perceived as a water privatization process [24] that will affect
the autonomy and governance of WUAs. The emphasis of the new regulation in the implementation
of activities through national government agencies limit the role of local communities and organized
WUA’s in implementing it [34]. Several outcomes of the policy are considered as threats by WUAs:
(1) it opens options to increase the number and type of users with access to the WUAs’ water
facilities; (2) it introduces new priorities in water access displacing household needs in favor of
other economic sectors; (3) it transfers the control and supervision of water quality to national
agencies, undermining the management capacities of WUAs and probably increasing water prices;
(4) it challenges community-based governance systems based on solidarity, reciprocity and direct
democracy; (5) it reduces the legitimacy of social participation in water management systems; and
(6) it only affects WUA’s and aqueducts that serve rural villages and towns, but does not guarantee
services to isolated areas. The Colombian Network of Community Pipelines has recently contested
this regulation by proposing to the Government a draft regulation that preserve the right to the
community-based management of water and maintain the WUA’s autonomy, preventing what they
called as the “privatization” of water supply to rural communities [35].
2. Case Study Selection
Mondomo village locates in the Santander de Quilichao municipality (Cauca Department,
Colombia). The village is located at 1350 m a.s.l. and is mainly composed of Afro-Colombian,
indigenous and mestizo inhabitants. Mestizos and Afro-Colombians mainly locate in Mondomo’s
town, while indigenous communities locate in the upper areas of the Mondomo’s river watershead.
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Mondomo village has approximately 3500 inhabitants and is currently considered an agro-industrial
centre because of its high provision of water and productive lands, as well as its proximity to roads
and ports. Livelihoods are linked to agriculture and the transformation of cassava to extract starch
(rallería). Starch extraction is the area’s principal economic activity, resulting in high water demand and
pollution. This processing creates a complex trade-off between using water for human consumption
and for agroindustry activities [34].
Water provision in the region comes mainly from independent WUAs [36]. The Mondomo’s WUA
initiated approximately 60 years ago, when a small group of water users defined their particular needs,
built an aqueduct and developed a payment scheme and participation processes. They prioritized
household needs, followed by water use for agricultural production. The first aqueduct was mainly
dedicated to water distribution but lacked an effective sanitation system. This aqueduct was managed
by a water administration committee plagued by management problems and economic deficit.
In 1994, a seismic shift damaged the water distribution system, acting as a trigger factor to
configure a private–public alliance around the construction of a new aqueduct. Different public and
private institutions [37] worked with the community in the design of the new aqueduct and in the
definition of the management rules, where the beneficiaries were the system’s administrators and could
define the local water governance scheme [38]. Design and execution activities for the new aqueduct
lasted from 1994 to 1998 and approximately 718,000 USD were invested by national and international
donors (World Bank, European Union and Inter-American Foundation). Initially, the community
was sceptical due to the long tradition of corruption and uncompleted projects. People were also
frustrated with the lack of transparency and control in the management of the first aqueduct. However,
a local University fostered a legitimate participatory process that attracted the interest of most of the
inhabitants, overcoming their traditional resistance and mistrust to work with publics agencies and
authorities [39].
The principal achievements of this alliance were as follows: the design, construction and start-up
of a complete clean drinking water supply, with almost 100% coverage; the creation of the Mondomo’s
WUA, as a public utility company with a community base; the land acquisition of plots on both
sides of the principal watershed to guarantee water access; the creation of a new culture around
participation processes, rationalization of water consumption and payment for the aqueduct services;
the effectiveness and transparency in the management of economic resources and investments; the
community’s credibility in managing a public service; and a strong feeling of ownership among the
users [40].
The Mondomo’s WUA has been selected as case study due to several reasons: (1) it is considered
as an example in the Colombian context of efficient combination of water national policies with local
needs [39]; (2) it uses technologies and maintenance methods that reduce electricity and chemical
products use [37]; (3) it currently fully covers increasing demand of water maintaining quality and
preserving the autonomous water governance designed schemes [21]; and (4) it belongs to the founder
group of one of the biggest second level WUA’s platform called AQUACOL [41,42]. Additionally, in
1998, it was distinguished by the World Bank as an example of an integral local initiative focused on
poverty alleviation in Colombia [43].
3. Methods
To consider the DPs as fuzzy sets, the first step was to define the categories that support varying
degrees of membership in the set [44] and represent real situations. We found inspiration in the coding
system proposed by Ratajczyk et al. [45], based on the codes established by Ostrom et al. [46] in the
Common Pool Resources Coding Manual, but we proposed our own definition of the categories that
represent potential situations in the governance systems of common pool resources.
The scores ranged from 0 (“fully out”) to 1 (“fully in”). We used 0.5 as the crossover point (neither
in nor out) [25] and established 4 additional degrees of membership for each DP. The degrees of
membership 0.2 and 0.4 are “more out than in”, and those of 0.6 and 0.8 are “more in than out”, and
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there are differences between them defining if they are “more or less in/out”, and “mostly in/out”
(see Table 2). The proposed degree of membership aimed to support the systematically coding of DPs
and increase the replicability of this working method by other researchers.
The second step was to describe the actual situation of the water governance in Mondomo’s WUA
using the IAD framework [26]. This descriptive single case study [47] is based on qualitative and
quantitative information collected between 2012 and 2015. We initially collected secondary information
from different technical, economic and legal sources to construct a narrative that describes the different
spheres (environmental, social, economic, etc.) interacting in the water management. After, we
analysed how the new legal framework could affect its governance system.
Finally, we scored membership for each of the DPs, both in the actual and in the most plausible
situation after the change of policy. MacQueen et al. [48] recommend the use of two or more coders
for qualitative analysis. We used four coders (two researchers and two members of NGOs working
on water management issues), all of them with working experience in the area, in WUAs and in
community-based management and governance. Both the number of coders and the clear definition
of the conditions that defined each score were intended to increase the transparency, reliability and
replicability of the research and to avoid the traditional bias of subjectivity in the social sciences.
To assess intercoder reliability we calculated Krippendorff alpha [49] using the irr-package in R.
The coders used the existing literature, most grey literature (Text S1), to characterize Mondomo’s WUA,
together with their knowledge of the situation. They independently scored each DP in both situations;
after, the scores were compared. Often, the scores were similar; where differences existed, the coders
assessed discrepancies and discussed the reasons behind their scores. The exercise of interpreting the
scores was very useful for identifying possible biases and for reaching a final consensus about the
score closest to reality. Finally, the differences between the actual and the new situations were analysed
to obtain answers to the second research objective.
4. Results
4.1. Categories of Membership Scores for Each DP
Table 2 present the results for the first research objective, depicting the six categories of
membership score established for each DP.
Table 2. Categories of membership score for each DP.
1A User Boundaries
0.0 No boundaries defined
0.2 The boundaries between users and nonusers are blurry
0.4 The boundaries between users and nonusers are clearly defined, but users cannot exclude nonusers
0.6 The boundaries between users and nonusers are clearly defined, but nonusers only can be excluded byexternal enforcement
0.8 The boundaries between users and nonusers are clearly defined, and users have internal means to exclude nonusers
1.0 The boundaries between users and nonusers are clearly defined, and nonusers can be excluded by both, internalmechanisms and external enforcement
1B Resource Boundaries
0.0 No boundaries defined
0.2 Boundaries result of institutional arrangements which do not limit entry
0.4 Boundaries result of natural/constructed attributes which do not limit entry
0.6 Boundaries result of institutional arrangements which limit entry
0.8 Boundaries result of natural/constructed attributes which limit entry
1.0 Boundaries result of natural/constructed and institutional arrangements which limit entry
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Table 2. Cont.
2A Congruence with Local Conditions
0.0 Rules do not match local social and environmental conditions
0.2 Externally imposed rules that partially match local social and environmental conditions
0.4 Internal rules partially congruent with local social and environmental conditions and no capacity to modify externalrules that not consider these conditions
0.6 Internal rules congruent with local social and environmental conditions and some capacity to modify external rulesthat not consider these conditions
0.8 Internal rules congruent with local social and environmental conditions and externally recognized internalmechanisms to push the adaptation of external rules
1.0 Internal and external rules congruent and fully adapted to the local social and environmental conditions
2B Appropriation and Provision
0.0 Inputs (associated costs) and benefits are not proportional
0.2 Inputs (associated costs) exceed benefits and are externally decided
0.4 Inputs (associated costs) exceed benefits and are internally decided
0.6 Inputs (associated costs) equal benefits but are externally decided
0.8 Inputs (associated costs) equal benefits and are internally decided
1.0 Benefits highly exceed inputs
3 Collective-Choice Arrangements
0.0 Operational rules cannot be modified
0.2 Most individuals cannot participate in modifying the operational rules
0.4 Most individuals can participate in modifying the operational rules, but need external approval
0.6 Most individuals can participate in modifying the operational rules without external approval, but external ruleshighly influence operational rules
0.8 Functional collective-choice arrangements exist, can be modified by users, but are not respected by non-users
1.0 Functional collective-choice arrangements exist, can be modified by users and are respected by users and non-users
4A Monitoring Users
0.0 Appropriation and provision levels are not monitored
0.2 Appropriation and provision levels are poorly monitored by monitors who are not accountable to users
0.4 Appropriation and provision levels are systematically monitored by monitors who are not accountable to users
0.6 Appropriation and provision levels are occasionally monitored by monitors who are accountable to users; theinformation collected is non-necessarily used to inform group decisions
0.8 Appropriation and provision levels are often monitored by monitors who are accountable to users; the informationcollected is used to inform group decisions
1.0 Appropriation and provision levels are systematically monitored and recorded by monitors who are accountable tousers; the information collected is used to inform group decisions
4B Monitoring the Resource
0.0 The condition of the resource is not monitored
0.2 The condition of the resource is poorly monitored by monitors who are not accountable to users
0.4 The condition of the resource is systematically monitored by monitors who are not accountable to users
0.6 The condition of the resource is occasionally monitored by monitors who are accountable to users; the informationcollected is non-necessarily used to inform group decisions
0.8 The condition of the resource is often monitored by monitors who are accountable to users; the information collected isused to inform group decisions
1.0 The condition of the resource is systematically monitored and recorded by monitors who are accountable to users; theinformation collected is used to inform group decisions
5 Graduated Sanctions
0.0 No sanctioning capacity
0.2 Rule violation derives in non-graduated sanctions
0.4 Rule violation derives in graduated sanctions by officials not accountable to the users (law enforcement)
0.6 Rule violation derives in graduated sanctions by other users (social sanctions)
0.8 Rule violation derives in graduated sanctions by officials accountable to the users (punishments, penalties . . . )
1.0 Rule violation derives in graduated sanctions by both, other users and officials accountable to users
6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
0.0 Users have no access to conflict-resolution arenas
0.2 Conflicts are solved in external arenas (courts, environmental authorities . . . )
0.4 Low-cost arenas exist, but are not easily accessible
0.6 Low-cost arenas exist, are easily accessible, but decisions are not always accepted (lack of trust, lack ofresponsibility . . . )
0.8 Low-cost arenas exist, are easily accessible and decisions are respected based on values such as legitimacyand reciprocity
1.0 Low-cost arenas exist, are easily accessible and have enforcement capacity
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Table 2. Cont.
7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize
0.0 Users have no right to devise their own institutions
0.2 Users have de facto right to devise their own institutions, but their decisions are not considered by externalgovernmental authorities
0.4 Users have de facto right to devise their own institutions, and their decisions are partially considered by externalgovernmental authorities
0.6 Users have de facto right to devise their own institutions, and their decisions are considered by externalgovernmental authorities
0.8 Users have de jure right to devise their own institutions, and their decisions are considered by externalgovernmental authorities
1.0 Users have de facto and de jure rights to devise their own institutions, and their decisions are considered andrespected by external governmental authorities
8 Nested Enterprises
0.0 CPR management activities are not organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises
0.2 CPR management activities lack horizontal (intercommunity connections) and vertical linkages (connections betweenmultiple jurisdictional levels)
0.4 CPR management activities have horizontal linkages but not vertical
0.6 CPR management activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises that create horizontal links
0.8 CPR management activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises that create vertical links
1.0 CPR management activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises that create horizontal andvertical links
4.2. Description of Mondomo´s WUA through the IAD Framework
4.2.1. Exogenous Variables
• Biophysical/Material Conditions
The basin of the Mondomo River covers approximately 11,200 hectares, of which approximately
60% located at the upper side of the watershed are covered by forests and natural vegetation and
inhabited by indigenous communities. The main sources of water are the Mondomo river, the
Montañitas stream and the Tiembla and San Pablo creeks. San Pablo creek is the most important source
of supply of the town and provides water to another three WUA’s (Cascajal, Pedregal, and Concepción)
with no aqueducts or treatment plants. The medium part of the basin (representing 20% of the area)
has a high degree of intervention by agricultural, mining and livestock activities. The lower part (the
remaining 20% of the surface) is where Mondomo village located and is characterized by high levels of
water consumption by the more than 60 cassava starch extraction industries (Figure 2).Water 2017, 9, 535 10 of 20 
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Mondomo´s aqueduct is catalogued as the most advanced drinking water supply system in
Colombia’s rural areas. The technology used for water purification is multi-stage filtration with low
consumption of chemicals and the distribution networks operate by gravity, minimizing the use of
energy for distribution [39]. Wastewater is collected by a system of sewage and discharged without
treatment to the Zanjón Tiembla, a tributary of Mondomo River. The sewage service is provided by
the Municipality, and the cleaning service by a public service company that has an agreement with
the WUA to include this charge in billing. As a management strategy, the WUA develops several
reforestation programs with the participation of environmental agencies and the local community in
their upper lands [40].
• Attributes of Community
Most of the users of the aqueduct are mestizo, but at the upper lands locate the indigenous councils
of La Concepción and Las Delicias. Approximately 780 Mondomo’s houses are currently connected to,
the aqueduct [39]. In the town centre, there are seven neighbourhoods, each with a Community Action
Board. The Association of Community Action Boards has become the most representative community
body. Another instance of strong representation is the guild of the rallanderos (processors of cassava
starch), as this industry is one of the main employers in the area. Community members are in charge
of the operation and maintenance of the water system. A police unit addresses minor conflicts and
represents the municipal administration in the area. Nowadays, illegal mining at the upper part of the
watershed is jeopardizing the water governance structure defined by the WUA, due to the difficulties
to solve conflict with armed actors [20].
• Rules
The aqueduct has a water concession issued by the local environmental agency (Corporación
Autónoma Regional del Cauca (CRC)), which, according to the Ministry of Environment and
Sustainable Development, is responsible for administering and granting authorizations for the use of
water (Law 99 of 1993). The maximum authority of the WUA is the Assembly of Users that defines
the general management of the WUA, hosts annual meeting to analyse the performance and the users
behaviour and implement changes in the general statutes, if needed. The Managing Board oversees
the implementation of the Assembly’s decisions [50].
The rules for the use of water are set forth in the statutes of the WUA, which establishes the rights
and duties of the associates and the functions of both administrative bodies. The statutes and the
procedures for the water provision service were structured per the guidelines of Law 142 of 1994 [34].
The initial rule design focused on the autonomy of local water governance, and was a participatory
process accompanied by research centres and universities. From the beginning, the community develop
a monitoring system, more oriented to capacity building than to punishment or exclusion [41].
The WUA has defined constitutional rules, internal operation rules and users’ regulation terms
that clearly count it as a community enterprise. The two first sets define the rules for elections of the
representative board, the duties and responsibilities of members and the aqueduct working method,
based on participatory and democratic constitution and functioning. The second set defines the tariffs
(entrance fee and water prices according to socioeconomic conditions), the mechanisms of conflict
resolution, and the duties of users (reforestation activities, payment, collective work, participation in
the WUA Board, etc.). The current WUA administrative board consider that the new water regulation
will particularly affect their autonomy to define fees, entrance regulations and reduce the investment in
conservation activities [34]. Therefore, they have actively participated in the design of the mentioned
draft submitted to the national government by the Colombian Network of Community Pipelines [35].
In terms of conflict management, the protocol to manage conflict internally is based on traditional
values such as cooperation, reciprocity and the identity created around the aqueduct beneficiaries
that help to maintain a low-cost conflict solving arena [50]. However, most of the actual conflicts
are with other communities that allow illegal mining in their territory. The attempts to establish
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agreements with members of the indigenous council La Concepción that permit productive (and
polluting) activities in conservation areas have not worked [34]. Campaigns have also been launched
by the CRC to prohibit bauxite mining in the tributary streams of the community aqueduct.
4.2.2. Action Arena
• Action Situations
The WUA has a granted water concession and pays the CRC an annual fee for water use.
It executes conservation actions with community members. Water purification treatment is performed
according to the regulations of the Ministry of Health. The payment system and tariffs are defined in
accordance with the guidelines of the water and basic sanitation regulation commission at the CRC
and the water use fees follow the rules established by the superintendents of public services [21].
• Participants
The identified actors or participants that are—directly or indirectly—part of Mondomo´s WUA
are as follows: water users, peasants and ranchers, “rallanderos”, WUA Managing Board members,
major municipalities, bauxite miners, the inspector of police, sanitation technicians, the CRC and the
Universidad del Valle [37]. The members of the WUA are organized in sub-commissions for health,
education and water quality that work together with the representatives to improve the governance
system through improving the social conditions of the members [34].
4.2.3. Interactions
The process of “formalization” of the WUA has entailed compliance with the sectoral regulations
of the administration and with the operation of water and sanitation systems, but has rendered
some agreements established by the community (i.e., free delivery of water to very poor families, the
performance of some works by users) as illegal, undermining the WUA’s operational capacity [50].
A relationship of compliance between the association and the sectoral authorities is then established
through the adoption of the normative package [21]. Between users and the Managing Board, a
collaborative relationship exists, evidenced by the presence of users in the assemblies and the active
users’ participation in conservation and maintenance activities. Contrarily, with the rallanderos and
the WUA of Cascajal there is a competitive relationship to secure access to water resources.
Three factors related to social interactions are highlighted by users, representatives and
international NGOs as drivers of WUA’s success: (1) the strong and active participation of the local
community, from the beginning; (2) the proven local capacity to solve local internal conflicts; and
(3) the managing capacity of the WUA board, not only in solving the economic problems of the first
water association but also in increasing the economic revenues to be invested in maintaining the
aqueducts, using social water prices.
4.2.4. Evaluative Criteria
Mondomo’s WUA indicators clearly differentiated it from other WUAs in Colombia: service
coverage is 100%; water losses are less than 7%; micro-measurement coverage is 100%; and users’
payment delays is 15% [40]. The implementation of other criteria is pending, such as criteria to
evaluate the co-responsibility for the pollution of the Mondomo River, as well as those to measure the
vulnerability of the sub-basin, and the effectiveness of the adopted measures of protection.
The highly active participation of the WUA management board has also been recognized by
different regional and national WUA second level platforms such as AQUACOL and the Colombian
Network of Community Pipelines, strengthening the influence of this WUA´s in the recognition of
alternative governance water models in Colombia [34].
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4.3. Changes in the Desing Principles Due to the New Policy Regulations
Table 3 presents the score of each DP in the actual and future situations, and the descriptions that
justify these scores.
Table 3. DP scores according to the fuzzy membership categories.
Design Principles
1A User Boundaries
Currently: Access to water is regulated. New users must request admission and fulfil requirements (entrance fee, water
fees and community work to maintain the aqueduct facilities), but Mondomo’s WUA has no enforcement capacity
(e.g., illegal users).
After policy changes: Water access can be determined by the capacity and willingness to pay and not necessarily by the
collective action mechanisms that currently define access. Mondomo’s WUA might lose capacity to exclude
current nonusers.
1B Resource Boundaries
Currently: Access to water in Colombia is a right, and where water sources such as rivers or gullies exist, different
actors can claim access. Thus, the limits cannot be easily defined, especially in rural areas. However, the constructed
limits of the aqueducts are perfectly defined. Only users legally connected to the system can have access to water.
After policy changes: No major changes are expected because the conflicts do not depend on the resource boundaries
but rather on the access to the water sources.
2A Congruence with Local Conditions
Currently: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions. A clearly
established and collectively decided payment system based on the consumption level, the use of water and the
economic status of households exists. Local rules not only cover provision and payment but also other activities such as
the rationalization of use, improvement of water provision and fostering a water-saving culture. However, Mondomo’s
WUA has little capacity to modify external rules that do not consider its local conditions.
After policy changes: External rules might be imposed over the traditional schemes and local social structures, giving
access to users according to their financial means. WUAs might function as private or mixed service provider
companies, losing their local-social approach and their matching of local conditions.
2B Appropriation and Provision
Currently: The benefits obtained by users thanks to the building of the aqueduct and the actual performance of
Mondomo’s WUA greatly exceed the inputs. Most of the time, users have access to quality water in the quantities they
need, and at a cheap price modulated as a function of the use and status of the users.
After policy changes: Costs might increase because WUAs will lose part of their decision-making and bargaining
powers and water price will be decided by regional and national regulation systems. The potential expansion of users
might surpass the resource provision levels, and benefits could be clearly reduced (e.g., many families could not afford
the water price).
3 Collective-Choice Arrangements
Currently: Mondomo’s WUA collective-choice arrangements are clearly defined. The managing board is appointed by
the users and its work is based on transparency and accountability schemes. All individuals affected by the operational
rules have the opportunity to participate in modifying them. The main decisions are taken in public assemblies open to
all the users but are not always respected by non-users.
After policy changes: The local/traditional decision-making process might be jeopardized, and new and more
bureaucratic processes can be imposed, complicating users’ options to modify rules.
4A Monitoring Users
Currently: Appropriation and provision levels are monitored, recorded and delineate the payment system. Monitors are
selected among the users and accountable to them (e.g., they can be asked to disclose their decisions regarding a user’s
violations of regulation codes). The information is used to make decisions.
After policy changes: The system monitoring can be taken over by external authorities. Mondomo’s WUAs might face a
decline in their capacity to monitor users’ appropriation and provision levels because their options to decide who
monitors users’ actions might be reduced.
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Table 3. Cont.
Design Principles
4B Monitoring the Resource
Currently: Monitors selected from the community continuously monitor water conditions to have information in real
time about the conditions of the resource. The information collected is used to make group decisions.
After policy changes: The resource monitoring can be taken over by external authorities. The capability to keep
systematic data to evaluate the state of the resource and the real capacity of users to access updated information
might decrease.
5 Graduated Sanctions
Currently: Mondomo’s WUA regulations define an internal gradual sanction scheme (known by all the users) that starts
with a private caution, followed by a public caution; then, a penalty or fine is applied and, if none of these options
works, the service is suspended. This sanction scheme is not only based on secure payment but includes social activities
and collective work related to the maintenance of the aqueduct. There are also social sanctions.
After policy changes: Sanctions might be established by external officials not accountable to users and principally based
on secure payment.
6 Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
Currently: Mondomo’s WUA has local well-established conciliation and bargaining protocols based on social values
(e.g., high reciprocity) and accessible to all users, which helps to low-cost conflict solving. Quite rarely, conflicts among
users are managed by national authorities (Superintendent of Public Services).
After policy changes: Conflicts might be negotiated and arbitrated by national-level institutions that are costly and
difficult to access for users.
7 Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize
Currently: Mondomo’s WUA have de facto (users and non-users accept the existence and rules of WUA) and de jure
(nationally recognised as public service provider association) rights to devise their own institutions and its
organizational structure and functioning are clearly recognized by national and regional environmental authorities.
After policy changes: Traditional de jure water rights recognized as belonging to Mondomo’s WUA might be
transferred to new users and agencies. Internal decisions might not be recognised by the authorities.
8 Nested Enterprises
Currently: Mondomo’s WUA is organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises with horizontal (its role exceeds
water management and external authorities rely on it to implement different health, education and investment
programs at local level) and vertical links (it belongs to AQUACOL, a second-tier organization, and to an aggrupation
of regional WUAs).
After policy changes: They will continue participating in different vertical activities and organizations, but users fear
they could lose independence and autonomy for horizontal links when other actors enter the scene.
The coding values and the Krippendorff alpha test for intercoder reliability, can be consulted in
Supplementary Materials Tables S1 and S2. Results showed that the agreement between coders is
higher for the situation after policy change (Krippendorff alfa = 0.490 and 0.829, respectively), but, in
both cases, the percentage of agreement (0.88 and 0.96, respectively) is higher than the percentage of
agreement by chance (0.77 and 0.79, respectively) at p-value < 0.05.
Figure 3 depicts how the scores change between the actual and the potential future situations.
In the actual situation, all DPs except 2A score 0.8 or 1 on membership. However, the situation might
dramatically change with the new legal and policy frameworks, leading to a general decrease in the
membership scores of most DPs.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Considering DPs as Fu zy Sets ethodological Contributions
DPs are configurations of rules that su por the emergence of effective governance [51] and one
of the primary methodologies within the literature to analyse CPR governance. However, the method
has receive l critiques: (1) the problems to measure outc mes aningfully and reliably [52,53];
( ) the measurement validity, especially with small amples [54]; (3) the difficulties to unpack causal
complexity in qualitative work [55]; and (4) the lack of comparability between case studie [52,56].
Considering DPs as fuzzy sets can contribute to theory building by addressing some of them.
The experi nce documented illustrates that approaching them as fuzzy sets allows a fine-grained
d finition [25] of these rules and avoids the simplifi ation of considering the DP as imply prese t or
absent. These rules can b present at a certain level or ca be better develop d in some systems than in
others. The p oposed categori s establish protocol to identify featur s that should be present in e ch
of DPs, support methodological tran p rency, help to systematically code t e DPs in categories
cording to the extent to whic these rules a e present, and as such, impose consistency and reliability
on the data llection, and facili ate comparisons and replicability of the findings [45].
Further, the categories prop sed can he p researchers t explore which combinations of rules are
present fo each m mber hip score and create opportunities to identify the necessary steps toward
su tainable governanc models.
Finally, th visualization using a spider web diagram gives a quick insight of the situation (in our
case of the initial and final es). This graphical representation immed ately communicates the DPs in
need of attentio . In the analysed case study, the tool and results ca support Colombia WUAs in t ir
di cussions with policymakers of the raft regulation to preserv the right to the Com unity-Based
Management of Water [19,35]. The results provide evidences on how the policy regulations and
actions might (unintendedly) hamper highly empowered local governance systems (as represented
by many WUAs in Colombia), and negatively affect long-lasting, effective collective-choice rules,
and monitoring and sanctioning processes [57]. Its use might assist communities, decision makers
and politicians in creating awareness and setting priorities for action, and CPR users to identify the
shortcomings of their governance system.
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5.2. A Long-Lasting Governance System in Danger
DPs cannot be conceived as a protocol for successful management or as a panacea; rather, they are
a first diagnostic tool to determine the “health” of the governance of a CPR [16]; further, not all DPs
need to be present in successful governance systems, and the non-existence of some of them should
not be considered a governance failure. From Figure 3 we deduce that the actual governance system of
Mondomo’s WUA can be considered healthy and robust [16], based on ecologically sustainable
management of water [58] and lacking important conflicts [59], as most DPs scored close to 1.
Mondomo’s governance system, based on collective management and values such as trust, reciprocity
and social cohesion, provides water for households and livelihoods at a social price that, in turn, covers
the costs of the service and generates surplus. Further, it protects the sources of water and conforms to
a social patrimony [20].
However, the new policy challenges this effective governance system. Some DPs (1A, 1B, 3,
and 8) only change slightly, but others undergo moderate (2A and 2B) or intense changes (4A, 4B,
5, 6, and 7). Furthermore, the changes in the scores of six DPs (2A, 4A, 4B, 5, 6 and 7) place them
below the crossover point for membership, which might introduce important pressures into the actual
governance system.
Both DP2s decrease but DP-2A (congruence with local conditions) shifts to “more out than in”
scores. Hence, the local rules based on solidarity (different water prices according to the household’s
socioeconomic status), self-organization to solve water problems and local cultural understanding
of the value of water [60] lose relevance. External standardized rules not recognizing the social
value of water nor its role in the community living standards can be imposed. Further, access and
entitlements to water security are mediated by institutions and infrastructure [61]. The potential shifts
in institutions and new infrastructures for water-demanding sectors will decrease the water available
to many families.
The actual situation of DP-2B (appropriation and provision) indicates the following: (1) users’
involvement in management and collective work is considered fair and not excessively demanding;
(2) the low tariffs derived from the technology used and the reduced distribution costs guarantee the
sustainability of the system; and (3) the internal rules recognize the inputs (labour and involvement
in decision making) of those users who worked on the construction of the aqueduct by establishing
an entrance fee for those who did not participate. These values of genuine involvement, respect
and appreciation for the governance system [62] will lose relevance if market principles regulate the
appropriation and provision of the resource.
The modifications in monitoring (DP-4A and DP-4B) and sanctioning (DP5) challenge democratic
water governance. The new policy reduces the WUAs power to monitor and sanction in favor of
national regulation agencies, opening options to governance mismatches. These agencies are often
considered inefficient, and users fear that this transfer of the monitoring process [63] might hamper
water management, giving outsiders or powerful economic sectors access to water and decreasing
the water allocation of current users. Further, the technology used and the community involvement
provide high quality water at a low cost, with minimal use of chemicals and electricity, but the new
situation will increase the costs of operation and consequently the price of water. Moreover, proximity
and local relations allow the actual sanctioning system to consider the local conditions and the users’
necessities before taking decisions, but the external agencies will not include these social considerations
in their operational system. The power inequalities between current users and external agencies will
decrease the capacity of the former to access the resource [15]. Some rights, such as the rights to make
transparent, equitable and evidence-based choices, can be lost by the local community as found by
Pahl-Wostl et al. [64].
Conflicts (DP6) are actually managed by the WUA’s board members. The democratic methods
used for settling differences [60] solve conflicts effectively. Boards are composed of neighbors who are
generally aware of each other’s realities and problems, as well as those of the community. Although
this does not preclude the existence of disagreement, it does enhance the Mondomo’s WUA’s ability
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to manage conflicts. The transfer of these powers to external agencies will dramatically erode this
capacity, challenging the traditional values that characterized the relations among users and increasing
the costs (time, money, accessibility) of solving them [65].
The dramatic change in the DP7 (recognition of rights to organize) score shows how the new
policy regulations might challenge the current governance institutions. They are based on the periodic
renewal of authority, the non-partisan nature of the WUA, and the awareness of community history.
Community leaders have a strong sense of commitment and dedicate significant efforts, free of charge,
to ensuring the WUA’s functioning [60]. The new regulation introduces the option to create new
institutions based on market criteria and payment capacity, without considering the existing local
social principles. Users fear that corruption practices could transfer power from the WUA to other
actors and that operational management results will be more inefficient and expensive [63].
However, DPs do not just occur together, they interact to produce outcomes [59]. Not only
the number of DPs present, but the configurations of DPs determine the success of the collective
action [59]. These configurations differ according to the mobility of the resource and the intensity of
the human-made infrastructure necessary for its management. In systems with high intensity of hard
human-made infrastructure and high mobility, such as water provision and distribution systems, the
combination of principles leading to successful governance are 1A (clearly defined social boundaries),
2A and 2B (congruence of rules and benefits), 5 (graduated sanctions) and 4A and 4B (monitoring of
users and resources) [59].
All these principles suffer important reductions in membership in the new scenario; moreover,
four of them (2A, 4A, 4B, and 5) shift to a “more out than in” score. The new regulation’s failure
to recognize the customary rights of Mondomo’s users might lead to governance mismatches [66]
and affect not only water security but also the social fabric articulated around Mondomo’s WUA.
This WUA faces the possibility that the actual local privatization of water by the aqueduct users
might shift to what Araral [54] describes as an externally imposed privatization of local commons.
Users might be frustrated by the difficulty of making decisions in mixed arenas subject to cognitive
mismatch and power plays [67] and by the little recognition at national and regional scales of WUA’s
important contribution to water access and other basic services for the population [23].
6. Conclusions
Considering DPs as fuzzy sets open new avenues for CPR governance research. It addresses
some of the problems of homogenizing different real situations and work with imprecise categories,
and introduce more possibilities to compare situations. We are cautious to affirm that the proposed
categories have to be the final ones and we cannot conclude on external validity [68], since we only
tested the method in one case study. We propose a starting point to the scholarly community; the
future testing of the method in a bigger number of case studies will permit to refine them and to be
more categorical about their validity.
The new water regulation intends to increase the quality and access to water in rural areas,
but, policymakers should not implement one-size-fits-all approaches that might led to the fading of
long-lasting place-based governance approaches like those represented by many Colombia WUAs.
The shift in the DPs highlights common dilemmas in CPR management and how the multi-level
context and power asymmetries affect community-based management. As repeatedly noted by
Ostrom, institutional arrangements are costly [16,29,69]. Mondomo’s users have made long-term
investments in creating their institutional arrangements. As a result, they have a locally managed
water governance system that is sustainable, efficient, democratic, adapted to local needs and provides
water at a low cost. Further, the system is part of a social patrimony that strengthens the social fabric,
local empowerment and the sustainable management not only of water but also of most local needs.
The new policy should adapt to ensure the safeguarding of these democratic governance systems.
As has been discussed throughout this manuscript, the above-mentioned threats might or might
not materialize. It will depend on how the policy is implemented in each place. We hopefully expect
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that the results of this analysis will be considered by the Colombian authorities to guarantee that the
new legal framework does not destroy something that works. We also hope that these results will
be of interest for other WUAs and support them in getting approved a specific water regulation that
recognise their role and preserve these democratic water governance systems.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/9/7/535/s1,
Text S1: List of documents used for coding the DPs, Table S1: Coding values, Table S2: Interrater reliability
with Krippendorff.
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